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On-siteDriverID: A Secure Authentication Scheme based of Spanish eID Cards for 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks 
Abstract: 
Security in Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) has been a topic of interest since the 
origins of vehicular communications. Different approaches have been followed as new 
security threats have emerged in the last few years. The approach of conditional privacy 
has been widely used as it guarantees authentication among vehicles but not revealing 
their real identities. Although the real identity of the vehicle can be traced by the 
authorities, the process to do that is time consuming and typically involves several 
entities (for instance road authorities that request the identification, license plate records 
bodies, a judge to allow revealing the identity associated to a license plate…). 
Moreover, this process is always subsequent to the detection of a road situation that 
requires knowing the real vehicle identities. However, in vehicular scenarios, authorities 
would beneficiate from knowing the real drivers’ identity in advance. We propose in 
this paper On-SiteDriverID, a secure protocol and its application which allows 
authorities’ vehicles to obtain drivers’ real identities rapidly and on demand on VANET 
scenarios. Thus, authorities would be able to gather information about drivers and 
vehicles, allowing them to act in a safer and better manner in situations such as traffic 
control duties or emergencies. The obtained simulation results in real VANET scenarios 
based on real maps guarantee that in the 60-70% of cases the proposed On-SiteDriverID 
successfully obtains the identity of the drivers. 
Keywords: PKI, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, Authentication, ID Card. 
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1. Introduction 
New security threats have emerged in the field of communications networks due to the 
recent growth of mobile computing and the intensive use of the Internet. The birth of 
new communication paradigms like the Internet of things (IoT) envision a world full of 
connected devices capable of exchanging information through the Internet [1]. The 
communications among such mobile devices must be carried out in a secure way so the 
interlocutors taking part in it can trust each other by means of authentication 
mechanisms. It is also important to guarantee message integrity and confidentiality of 
the information exchanged. 
In general computer networks, there are plenty off-the-shelf security resources that 
could be applied with affordable costs in order to provide authentication. Methods for 
authentication are often categorized as i) something known, such as a password, ii) 
something possessed, for instance an identity card or iii) something a person is, i.e. a 
personal characteristic like a fingerprint. Smart cards bring less security vulnerabilities 
than only-password based authentication, and also their security deployment is cheaper 
than biometrics. Smart cards are considered a two-factor authentication mechanism, 
which is based in something possessed, that is the card, and something known, a 
password [2]. Also, smart cards’ cryptographic capacity and portability are two features 
that make them one of the most widely adopted authentication methods [3]. 
National Governments have promoted the use of this authentication method during the 
last decade, improving the existing identity (ID) cards to include an information security 
infrastructure for citizens. This is the case of Spain, where the personal ID card has 
become a smart card, named after electronic ID or eID from now on. The Spanish eID 
contains personal information within a microchip that can be used for information 
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security purposes. The Spanish government is constantly promoting the electronic use 
of ID cards and has been distributing the API for developing new services based on it 
[4]. In addition to these resources, it can also be found a complete public key 
infrastructure (PKI), which is based on the Spanish ID card. This infrastructure is 
enabled and managed by the General Directorate of Police, known in Spanish as 
Dirección General de la Policía, DGP from now on. A complete description of the PKI 
used in the Spanish eID can be found in [5]. This PKI makes use of X.509 certificates 
[6] and the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [7]. Thus, the Spanish eID 
enables to any Spanish citizen to authenticate him against any service that requires 
identification, making use of its digital signature and also other security mechanisms. It 
is worth pointing out that the digital or electronic advanced signature is considered like 
the handwritten signature by the Spanish law. 
Ad hoc networks [8], and also the broader concept of Internet of Things paradigm [9], 
require novel security mechanisms. These networks are susceptible of both common 
and brand-new security threats [10]. The infrastructure-less nature of ad hoc networks, 
the fact of every node acting as a router, the mobility and the use of wireless 
communications links are the main reasons of such new security threats. As mentioned 
in [11], it is difficult to ensure authenticity and confidentiality in ad hoc networks, but 
one way to establish secure communications in ad hoc networks is the use of 
authentication and certification services. 
As occurs with routing protocols for ad hoc networks, there is not a perfect security 
solution for ad hoc networks that guarantees secure communications in every situation, 
so the solution highly depends on the scenario characteristics. 
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In this paper, the Spanish eID is used to develop  On-SiteDriverID, a secure 
authentication scheme and its application for urban VANET scenarios. In those 
scenarios, the road authorities, for instance the police, may find useful to know the real 
identity of the driver before taking any action. The proposed security scheme is of high 
interest as improves security in VANETs, specifically in situations where a direct, on-
site and on demand authentication mechanism is required by a road authority
1
. Our 
solution of using the eID to secure specific communications in V2V communications 
complements current approaches for securing VANETs. 
The primary objective of On-SiteDriverID is the creation of secure VANET scenarios 
through a mechanism that allows authorities to easily and automatically obtain drivers’ 
identities. This avoids involving other entities (such as a judge) in the driver 
identification process which would make it complex and time-consuming. 
Consequently, On-SiteDriverID has a user-centric design from the point of views of the 
authorities which get the drivers’ identities easily, from the point of view of the drivers 
which identify themselves against the authorities smoothly. This is simply accomplished 
by running the application that implements On-SiteDriverID security scheme. 
The main contributions of this paper are twofold: 
 The design of On-SiteDriverID, a secure authentication scheme and its 
application for VANET road authorities, based on the already in use Spanish 
eID smart cards. 
 The evaluation of the proposed On-SiteDriverID on simulated realistic VANET 
urban scenarios. 
                                                 
1
 We call “authority” in this paper to any public organization with authority in the domain of road traffic. 
Examples of these are the police, and other emergency bodies like firefighters and paramedics. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the related work. Section III 
describes the Spanish eID card and its public key infrastructure implementation. Section 
IV describes the On-SiteDriverID application, its application scenario and its 
implementation. The simulations results of an urban scenario are presented in section V. 
Finally, some conclusions are drawn in the section VI. 
2. Related work  
Several works describe the challenges in the field of secure ad hoc networks and the 
requirements for adapting traditional security mechanisms to ad hoc networks [12], 
[13], [14]. In [13], it is stated that a combination of cryptographic mechanisms can 
prevent the majority of attacks in ad hoc networks. In [11], [15], [16] and [17] the 
authors propose cryptographic mechanisms based on Public Key Infrastructure, PKI 
from now on, for securing ad hoc networks. 
Regarding security mechanisms for VANETs, it is clear that there is a need for the 
information to be secured [18], as the messages contain relevant information such as 
driving routes and timestamps. Revealing this information associated with drivers’ 
identity could be used for malicious purposes. 
In [19], it is stated that PKI is one of the most suitable options for securing VANETs. 
Both authentication and non-repudiation are essential for identifying vehicle drivers 
liable for certain actions such as car accidents or traffic infractions. Even so, the security 
hardware architecture in VANETs was conceived with two main in-vehicle devices: i) 
the event data recorder or EDR, for recording vehicles’ critical data in emergency 
situations; and ii) a tamper-proof device or TPD, responsible for all the cryptographic 
operations and the storage of private keys and certificates. 
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In [19], the authors also propose a Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure or VPKI. In this 
approach, the Certificate Authorities (CAs) will issue public-private key pairs for each 
vehicle, and at the same time, each vehicle would have a list of anonymous, but 
certified, keys that change frequently and are like one-time keys. This will maintain the 
drivers’ privacy in order to protect them from several threats, but at the same time has to 
allow the authorities to reveal the message’s source, i.e. the vehicle, for driving liability 
purposes. This is known as conditional privacy or conditional anonymity in [18]. 
Usually the approval of a judge is required in order to reveal the real identity of the 
driver [19]; other approaches involve several entities in this process, such as [20], which 
defines a Tracing Manager for approving the search of real identities and the 
Membership Manager which performs the search of the real identity in a database.  
As stated in [21], the authentication schemes using smart cards are one of the simplest 
and most convenient authentication methods for secure data communications in 
insecure network environments. In [22], a protocol called PAAVE is described. This 
protocol uses smart cards for securing VANETs communications. In PAAVE, the 
vehicle firstly authenticates itself against a Road Side Unit (RSU) through a public key 
cryptography procedure in which the RSU shares with the vehicle a session key; the 
session key is shared by all the vehicles authenticated against the same RSU so they can 
read other vehicles messages anonymously, i.e. the RSU is the only entity that could 
know the real identity of the driver. However, the vehicle’s real identity is limited to 
knowing the driving license to identify the driver/owner. PAAVE does not clarify if a 
person driving a vehicle, and not being the owner of it, could be identified. 
The previous works [18], [19] and [20] provide real identities of the vehicles in specific 
road events after the event occurred, in a time-consuming manner and usually in a 
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process that involves several entities participation. Also, these works do not provide 
driver’s information, but about the vehicle identity and ultimately about the owner.  
In Spain, there is the guarantee that every car driver will be carrying an identification 
smartcard with him whenever he is driving i.e. the Spanish eID. 
The Spanish eID has been used previously to create secure communications over 
wireless communications technologies such as Near Field Communications (NFC) [23]. 
In this paper, we propose a smart card based secure authentication scheme for VANETs 
based on the Spanish electronic ID card. In some cases the fact of a road authority 
having access to the driver’s eID before responding to a road situation could be an 
advantage. This is beneficial because they could deal with these situations in a safer 
manner by knowing this driver’s useful information in advance. On-siteDriverID 
advances in the integration of the security mechanisms available within the Spanish eID 
into VANET communications. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other works in this field which have followed 
this specific approach for straight, on demand and on-site authentication of a vehicle 
driver against authority vehicles using eIDs in VANETs. 
3. The Spanish eID and its Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
The Spanish eID, now on DNIe, is the official identification card used in Spain. It is 
compulsory for citizens over fourteen years old. This card is a personal and non-
transferrable document issued by the Ministry of the Interior. Figure 1 shows the 
Spanish DNIe.  The DNIe can be described discerning between its physical 
characteristics and the digital information contained in its chip. 
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Physically, DNIe is a polycarbonate card which follows the ISO 7816 standard for 
smart cards [24]. It includes personalized information such as a photograph, the holder’s 
personal signature, among other personal information. Several security elements are 
included in the DNIe and can be classified according to their perception capabilities: 
 First level (user perception): Holograms, kinegrams, iridescences, etc. 
 Second level (perception using devices): reactive UV inks, micro writing, etc. 
 Third level (laboratory perception): Biometric comparison.      
 
Figure 1. (a) Front DNIe; (b) back DNIe 
From the point of view of the data included inside DNIe chip, the information is divided 
into three different security levels, which are in read-only access. These levels are: 
 Public zone (without restricted access): CA intermediate issuing certificate, 
holder public keys, component certificate. 
 Private zone (access with a Personal Identification Number or PIN): Holder 
signature, authentication X.509v3 certificates and holder private keys. 
 Security zone (only accessible through police equipment): Electronic 
information which is the same than that physically written, biometric data, and 
the device serial number. 
The DNIe is considered a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) according to the 
Common Criteria EAL 4+ in the protection profile CWA 14169 [25] certified by the 
ETSI, the RFC 3739 and the European directive 99/93/EC [26]. The PKI 
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implementation for the DNIe is based on the X.509 standard [27], and is issued and 
signed previously by a Certification Authority, CA from now on. The veracity of 
certificating relies on the CA, if the CA and its methods can be trusted, then the 
certificate will be also trusted.  
The DNIe enables a holder signature certificate. The purpose of the signature certificate 
is to allow citizens to have the possibility of digitally signing transactions and 
documents, guaranteeing both message integrity and authorship. To get the signature 
certificate is necessary to insert the holder PIN over a trusted channel [25] with the 
SSCD. Each signed task has to be authorized by the DNIe holder since the advanced 
electronic signature in Spain is equivalent to the legal hand signature [28], [26]. Several 
DNIe data fields that should be highlighted are: 
 Subject: the holder personal data. 
 Issuer: DGP. 
 Subject Public Key Information: RSA encryption with key length of 2048 bits. 
 Validity Period: 30 moths. 
 Certificate Signature Algorithm: SHA-256 with RSA Encryption and SHA-1 
with RSA Encryption.  
4. On-SiteDriverID application using the Spanish eID in VANETs scenarios 
In this paper, we propose the application of the proposed On-SiteDriverID in urban 
scenarios, where public organizations with authority in the domain of road traffic are 
present. Examples of these organizations are the police, and other emergency bodies 
like firefighters and paramedics. These organizations, called authority from now on, 
deal with traffic situations every day such as traffic control, roadblocks, car accidents, 
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etc. These authorities may be either physically present in traffic situations, such as 
driving authority vehicles, or remotely using the communications infrastructure 
available such as Road Side Units (RSU). We apply the proposed On-SiteDriverID in 
two common VANET scenarios, vehicle-to-vehicle communications (V2V) and 
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), which represent most of the situations where the 
proposed authentication protocol can be used. In the used VANET scenarios the 
authority vehicles will request directly and on demand drivers’ real identities. 
Consequently, there are no intermediary nodes in our scheme. 
 
4.1. On-SiteDriverID authentication scenarios 
According to the VANET types of communications, we consider two typical VANET 
scenarios such vehicle-to-vehicle communications (V2V), which represent the situation 
when the authority is represented by an authority vehicle (e.g. a police vehicle) and 
vehicle-to-infrastructure communications (V2I), in the case the authority take actions in 
the traffic situation remotely by using the communications infrastructure (e.g. the 
RSUs). The proposed On-SiteDriverID can easily applied to those scenarios to provide 
authentication services. 
a) Vehicle-to-Vehicle authentication 
We consider a scenario in which there are several vehicles driving along the roads of an 
urban area. The map is represented as a directed graph in which the roads are edges and 
the vertices are intersections. There is a set of vehicles moving around the network, each 
one at a different speed and with different direction. In this scenario, we include several 
authority vehicles, i.e. police cars, patrolling the area. The authority will request a direct 
and on-demand authentication to some vehicles of the network while they are moving. 
For example, a police car could request a driver to authenticate in the case it is 
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suspicious of any road infraction. This scenario is depicted in Figure 2. An important 
feature is that both the authority and the driver are moving so the time during which the 
proposed On-SiteDriveID is run should be shorter than in the case of V2I case. 
 
Figure 2. Vehicle-to-Vehicle authentication 
b) Vehicle-to-Infrastructure authentication 
In this scenario the authentication request is sent to driving vehicles from an authority 
body located in a fixed position. As an example, we can find this situation when a 
police vehicle is stopped on the road side and is requesting to the vehicles driving by to 
authenticate. Another example is when a traffic monitoring task is performed by a Road 
Side Unit (RSU) [29]. This scenario is depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Fixed position and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure authentication 
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Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communications usually involve the communication between 
a vehicle and a RSU; however, as police vehicles performing traffic monitoring tasks 
can be also in a fixed static position close to the road, we have considered this situation 
as a V2I type. 
4.2. Protocol description 
We propose the following scheme to perform the identification of the real vehicle driver 
upon the request of an authority. To make a clear explanation of the On-siteDriverID 
scheme, we first introduce the data exchanged between the authority (represented by 
either an authority vehicle or an RSU) and the driver’s vehicle. 
The On-SiteDriverID authentication protocol consists of 4 messages exchanged 
between the authority and a driver’s vehicle. These messages are depicted in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Messages Exchange for Driver Identification 
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Initially, the authority broadcasts a message called DIREQ (Driver Identification 
REQuest). Upon receiving a DIREQ message, a driver’s vehicle will respond 
automatically with On-SiteDriverID protocol performed within the vehicle’ TPD 
(tamper-proof device), in which the Spanish eID is integrated. Firstly, the TPD will 
check if the authority certificate is a valid one, i.e. whether the certificate is signed by a 
trusted party. In our implementations we trusted the certificates issued by the General 
Directorate of Police, as it is the same authority that issues the Spanish eID. 
The driver’s vehicle will respond to the DIREQ by broadcasting a message containing 
the sign certificate from the Spanish eID card. This certificate contains the driver’s 
public key (dKpu) and also the sing of a third party guaranteeing that the dKpu belongs 
to the driver. In the case of the Spanish eID the Third Party is the Spanish General 
Directorate of Police. This message is sent encrypted with the authority’s public key 
(aKpu), thus it is guaranteed that no one but the authority in question will be able to 
read the drivers certificate. This protects the driver’s from bogus nodes aiming at 
impersonating an authority, as these will not be able to access the driver’s certificate 
because they do not have the authority private key (aKpri) needed for the decryption.  
The authority vehicle, receives the driver’s sign certificate. Then, the authority 
generates a SHA-1 hash challenge, encrypts it with the dKpu and broadcasts it. 
When the driver’s vehicle receives the challenge message, decrypts it and signs it with 
its private key, dKpri. Then, the driver’s TPD composes a message with the signed 
challenge and other non-signed information regarding the identity of the driver and the 
vehicle. This information consists of the driver’s ID (dID), the vehicle license plate 
(LiPlate) and the vehicle location (vehPos). Eventually, the driver’s TPD sings the 
entire message with the aKpu and broadcasts the message. 
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After receiving this information, the authority vehicle decrypts the message with its 
private key (aKpri) and decrypts the hash with the driver’s public key (dKpu). If the 
challenge coincides with the one that the authority vehicle generated for this 
communication, then the authority can trust the ID of the driver, together with the 
license plate and the vehicle location. This protocol guarantees authentication and non-
repudiation. 
The messages exchanged in this protocol are composed of several fields. The first 
message’s fields, also known as DIREQ or message 0, are described in Table 1. The 
size of the data fields have been calculated according to the requirements of the 
information to be transmitted. The aID field has a size of 63 bits, which yields from 
encoding with 7-bits ASCII the authority ID which is 9 characters long. The Authority 
Body data field is explained in Table 2. The Authority Certificate field size is of 1.5 kB, 
however depending on the information contained in the certificate the size could vary.  
Data Fields Description Size 
Authority ID 
(aID) 
The proper identification of the authority e.g. the police agent 
badge number, or the police vehicle license plate. 
63 b 
Authority 
body 
(aB)  
The authority organization e.g. Police, Health Services… 3 b 
Authority’ 
certificate 
(aCert) 
A certificate issued by the Certification Authority which 
certifies the Authority’s Public Key. In our case, it is 
considered the DGP (Spanish General Directorate of Police) 
as it is the same CA issuer of the Spanish DNIe. 
1.5 kB 
Table 1. DIREQ message or message 0 data fields 
The Authority ID field is used in case it is needed to reveal the police agent that 
requested the identification of the driver. In Spain, the law enforcement bodies are 
obliged to carry their professional identification visible on their uniforms. This field acts 
as the visible authority identification number. Due to differences between several 
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bodies’ professional identification numbers, this field has been represented using 9 
alphanumeric characters, using 8 bits to represent each other (Extended ASCII). 
In the Authority Body field (aB), 3 bits are used for identifying the entity that is behind 
the authentication request. In our implementation we mapped each number represented 
with these bits to a law enforcement organization or emergency services. Some codes 
are not used yet, and could be used in the future for other organizations using the On-
SiteDriverID scheme. 
Number 
Authority 
Body 
Description 
000 National Police 
Higher law enforcement body in Spain, mainly present in 
urban areas 
001 
Municipal 
Police 
Law enforcement body with duties in municipal or local 
scenarios 
010 Guardia Civil 
Spanish law enforcement body actively involved in rural 
areas and highways traffic operations 
011 
Health Care 
Services 
Public or private Health Care services bodies with 
ambulances present in the roads and aiding in car accidents 
100 Military Military forces 
101 Future uses - 
110 Future uses - 
111 Future uses - 
Table 2. Authority Body field codes 
The driver’s vehicle responds to the DIREQ message with a message containing the 
driver’s sign certificate. This message receives the name of message 1. The authority 
vehicle can extract from this certificate the driver’s public key (dKpu). The fields of this 
message are described in Table 3. The Drivers’ sign certificate field size is of 1.8 kB. 
As stated before, this is based on typical certificate sizes used on public Spanish 
authentication services such as the Spanish eIDs, but depending on the size of the 
certificate this file could vary. 
Data Fields Description Size 
Drivers’s sign 
certificate 
(dSignCert) 
The driver’s Sign Certificate obtained from the 
Spanish eID. This certificate contains the driver’s 
public key (dKpu) and a trusted third party sing for 
1.8 kB 
 16 
validation. This message is encrypted with the aKpu. 
Table 3. Driver’s sign certificate message or message 1 
The message sent by the authority vehicle containing the SHA challenge is described in 
Table 4. This message is also known as message 2. The authority vehicle creates a 
SHA-1 hash challenge that must be signed by the driver’s side in order to guarantee 
authentication and non-repudiation. The SHA-1 challenge field has been considered 
with a size of 192 bits as a result of the encryption of the SHA-1 challenge. 
If this message is not received by the corresponding driver within the established time 
(Delay before the 1
st
 retransmission, more details in next Section), it considers that the 
message was lost, and in consequence, the driver will send again the message 1. After 
two retransmissions, if the message 2 is not received by the driver, it will discard the 
message and the procedure is finished. 
Data Fields Description Size 
SHA-1 
Challenge (Ch) 
A single per-session SHA-1 hash challenge created in the 
Authority side and encrypted with the dKpri. 
192 b 
Table 4. Authority challenge message or message 2 
Finally, the message containing the driver’s identity and related information is 
described in Table 5. This message receives the name of message 3. The Driver’s ID 
field contains the personal ID number of the driver, which is unique. The TPD device 
will include also the vehicle License Plate in the message. The Vehicle Position field is 
included in order to provide more accurate information about the position of the vehicle. 
Eventually, the SHA-1 hash challenge signed with the dKpri. The dID field has a size of 
63 bits which coincides with the ID size considered for authorities in Table 1. The 
License Plate field requires 35 bits which is the result of encoding the 4 numbers and 3 
letters of a typical Spanish License Plate. The Vehicle Position field has a size of 32 bits 
due to the fact of using 32 bit decimal fixed point representation of the latitude and 
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longitude of the position. The SHA-1 Challenge field has a size of 192 bits as explained 
previously in Table 4. The total size of the message is 387 bits as a result of the addition 
of the previous data fields and the encryption with the aKpu.  
When a message 3 is not received by authority node, it uses the same technique 
employed in message 2, but in this case the authority node will retransmit the message 
2. The time that the authority waits before retransmitting is named as Delay before the 
2
nd
 retransmission (more details are included in the next Section). 
Data Fields Description Size 
Driver’s ID 
(dID) 
The driver’s identification number from the DNIe. 63 b 
License Plate 
(LiPlate)  
The License Plate of the vehicle, included in the TPD. 35 b 
Vehicle Position 
(vehPos) 
The vehicle position of the driver’s vehicle. 32 b 
SHA-1 Challenge (Ch) The SHA-1 hash challenge encrypted with the dKpri. 192 b 
TOTAL The previous fields encrypted with the aKpu. 387 b 
Table 5. Driver’s identity message or message 3 
Figure 5  shows a flow diagram which summarizes the proposed logic of the exchange 
of messages in the On-SiteDriverID protocol. 
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Figure 5 On-SiteDriverID Protocol Flowchart 
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5. Experimental results 
This section presents the experiment results that validate the proposed On-SiteDriverID 
protocol. First, we show the implementation of a real prototype to be embedded in 
vehicles to easily use On-SiteDriverID. Second, we conduct a simulation study using 
VANET map-based scenarios.  
5.1.On-SiteDriverID implementation prototype 
We propose integrating an electronic device to the tamper-proof device (TPD) which 
enables the usage of the Spanish DNIe. This is used for securing the messages 
exchanged between the authorities’ vehicle and other drivers in the aforementioned 
scenario. 
We followed the communications architecture of a VANET defined in [29]. The 
communications equipment installed within a vehicle is called ITS vehicle station 
(Intelligent Transportation System), OBU (On-Board Unit) or OBE (On-board 
Equipment), depending on the standardization naming convention. The ITS vehicle 
station may be composed of different devices, namely an OBU router, an OBU host an 
OBU gateway. The implementation of the ITS vehicle station may differ from one 
vehicle to another depending on the type of vehicle and its applications. For example, in 
[29] three types of implementations are considered depending on the size of the vehicle. 
The definition of which devices compose the OBU is open to the vehicle manufacturer. 
We propose a communication system similar to the OBU described in [30], but with 
some differences for the integration of the Spanish DNIe. The system that we propose is 
composed of two sub-systems, the communication sub-system and the DNIe TPD. 
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The main components of the communication sub-system are shown in Figure 6. These 
components perform as the OBU router module defined on the standards. These 
components are listed below: 
 Alix3D3 Router Board 
 MikroTik R52H 802.11AGB wireless network card 
 4GB CompactFlash card 
 Dipole antenna dual 5GHz/2,4GHz 5 dBi 
 
Figure 6. Alix3D2 with the MikroTik R52H wireless cards 
In addition, the main components of the DNIe TDP are listed below. In our case the 
TPD is integrated with the OBU Host module defined on the standard: 
 A Spanish DNIe 
 DNIe card reader 
 Raspberry Pi 
It is important to note that in our system we have not implemented a whole TDP with a 
privacy-preserving scheme as the ones described in the related work section. 
Conversely, we have focused on the security provided by the On-SiteDriverID 
application in the target scenarios previously described. 
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Also it is worth to mention that the implementation of the secure device called as TPD 
in the literature has been partially implemented as part of the module called OBU Host 
in the standard [29]. This is due to the fact that the security services that are developed 
in typical VANET communications are a vertical block, which means that different 
security aspects can be implemented as different layers of the ITS communications 
stack and also to a different extent depending on the device. 
The vehicle driver DNIe has to be inserted in the smartcard reader when the application 
is running in order to be able to respond to the messages requesting the real identity of 
the driver in the case a law enforcement vehicle requires it. 
5.2. Simulation environment set up 
Simulated scenarios 
The proposed On-SiteDriverID has been implemented in a prototype with the aim of 
being installed in real vehicles. However, the evaluation of the proposed On-
SiteDriverID in a real scenario is difficult since it requires a considerable amount of 
hardware investment and also the involvement of the authority organizations. In order to 
overcome these difficulties, simulation tools are a good alternative as they provide the 
possibility of defining scenarios according to specific features and simulate the 
performance of VANET applications on them.  
The simulation framework used in this paper consisted in Citymob for Roadmaps (C4R) 
[31] for generating the mobility of vehicles in a road network. C4R is developed onto 
OpenStreetMap [32] tool, which gets the real roadmaps, and SUMO [33], which 
generates the vehicles’ movements. The main features of the scenarios simulated are 
shown in Table 6. We select three different number of authority nodes to evaluate the 
proposed On-SiteDriverID protocol under different levels of congestion. Notice that the 
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higher the number of authority nodes, the higher the congestion. This is due to the fact 
that the number of authentication processes executed depends on the number of 
authority nodes. The chosen average speed is suitable for an urban scenario since in 
Spain the speed limit is fixed to 30 km/h in residential urban scenarios. The IDM 
mobility model [34] is widely used to emulate the movements of vehicles in urban 
scenarios. As a car-following model, the IDM describes the dynamics of the positions 
and velocities of single vehicles. 
Feature Description 
Number of authority nodes 1, 4 or 9 depending on the situation 
Number of driver’s vehicles 100 
Vehicles average speed 30 km/h 
Simulation area 1000 square meters 
Mobility model Intelligent driver model (IDM) [34] 
Map Barcelona city (Spain) 
Table 6. Main features of the simulated scenarios 
 
 
Figure 7 City layout and node movements 
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Figure 7 depicts the area of Barcelona, the one that has been used for the simulations. 
The top part of the Figure 7 is the model obtained from C4R; the left bottom part 
depicts the V2I communications and right bottom part the V2V communications. Each 
color that appears in Figure 7 represents a different node. 
In order to simulate the communications and the exchange of messages among the 
authority and driver’s vehicles in the simulated scenario, we have used the standard de-
facto network simulation tool, NS-2 [35]. The main communications network 
characteristics are shown in Table 7. We use the IEEE 802.11p standard which is 
envisioned to be used in VANET scenarios according to Wireless Access Vehicular 
Environment (WAVE) suite standards. Regarding some design parameters of On-
SiteDriveID protocols, we select the maximum number of retransmission as 2. 
Consequently, the authorities will try to retransmit the messages up to 2 times before 
considering that the vehicles are out of their radio transmission ranges. 
Feature Description 
Access technology IEEE 802.11p 
Transmission range 250 m 
Propagation model Two-ray ground 
Max. number of retransmissions if a message is lost 2 
Delay before the 1
st
 retransmission 20 seconds 
Delay before the 2
nd
 retransmission 40 seconds 
Table 7. Main communications network features 
The delay before the 1
st
 retransmission has been chosen of 20 seconds. The reason for 
this is that the largest message processing time of the On-SiteDriverID is about 15 s. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to select a bigger delay than 15 s in order to avoid 
sending a retransmission during the time the other interlocutor is processing the 
received message. Moreover, the delay before the 2
nd
 retransmission has been chosen 
double of the first delay. The reason for this selection is that in a real VANET the 
vehicles are moving and the time spent in a message to be received processed and sent 
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back again it is not only affected by the processing time, but it is affected by the 
location and speed of vehicles. Thus we chose 40 s in order to consider a largest delay 
that takes into account also the vehicle dynamics. 
Performance metrics 
In order to measure the effectiveness and performance of the On-SiteDriverID 
application, we used the metrics described in Table 8. 
Metric Description 
Rate 1 
The number of messages of type 1 received by the vehicles (either in the 
first transmission, the first retransmission or the second retransmission) 
divided by the total number of messages type 1 sent by the authorities. 
Rate 2 
The number of messages of type 2 received by the vehicles (either in the 
first transmission, the first retransmission or the second retransmission) 
divided by the total number of messages type 2 sent by the authorities. 
Rate 3 
The number of messages of type 3 received by the vehicles (either in the 
first transmission, the first retransmission or the second retransmission) 
divided by the total number of messages type 3 sent by the authorities. 
Completed 
The number of successfully completed processes of the On-SiteDriverID 
application divided by the total number of processes started. A successful 
completion of the process means that the authority vehicle has been able to 
authenticate the driver’s ID.  
Table 8. Performance metrics measured during the simulations 
 
Simulation results 
The proposed metrics have been measured for two different situations. On the one hand, 
communications between vehicles and the infrastructure (V2I), where the authority gets 
the identity of the driver’s through the road infrastructure such as the RSUs (see Figure 
8). On the other hand, communications between vehicles (V2V), where the authority is 
represented by the authority vehicle driving along the roads (see Figure 9).  
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Figure 8 Simulation results for V2I Communications 
 
The obtained results are promising since more that 70% of the processes, started by the 
authority, are successfully completed. The retransmission policy implemented by the 
OnSiteDriveID protocol is suitable for ensuring a higher number of successful 
processes. As we can see in Figure 8, messages of type 1 are the only ones that suffer 
from unsuccessful delivery to the receivers and, consequently, they need of first 
retransmissions (green color) and second retransmissions (blue colors). This is obvious 
because at the time of starting a process there are vehicles that are located on the edge 
of the transmission range of the authority (RSU) and are moving away of the authority. 
Thus, the first message can be received but as the driver’s vehicle is not within the 
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transmission range of the authority vehicle, the police could not receive the message of 
type 1, and consequently there is the need of retransmissions.  
The messages of type 2 and 3 do not suffer from retransmissions as we can see in Figure 
8. This could be mainly related to the fact that if the authority is able to receive the 
message of type 1 from a driver’s vehicle directly probably is because the authority (the 
RSU) and the driver are close enough to each other to complete the whole process 
without retransmissions. 
V2I Communications 
  Transmited  Received 
1 Authority Node 
 
Message Type 
 
Message Type 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Nº Messages Nº Messages 
0 Retransmission 14 12 10 13 12 10 
1 Retransmission 11 0 0 3 0 0 
2 Retransmissions 3 0 0 3 0 0 
4 Authority Nodes 
 
Message Type 
 
Message Type 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Nº Messages Nº Messages 
0 Retransmission 33 29 26 18 29 26 
1 Retransmission 15 3 0 9 0 0 
2 Retransmissions 6 3 0 2 0 0 
9 Authority Nodes 
 
Message Type  Message Type 
1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 
Nº Messages Nº Messages 
0 Retransmission 56 44 40 31 44 40 
1 Retransmission 25 4 0 12 0 0 
2 Retransmissions 13 3 0 1 0 0 
Table 9. Summary of simulation results for V2I communications. 
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Table 9 summarizes the simulation results obtained for V2I communications, where it 
can be observed that the retransmission policy is also effective for the messages type 2. 
However, it is difficult to be noticed in the previous Figure 8. 
The second situation, represented in Figure 9, corresponds to V2V communications. In 
this case the results are slightly worse than in the previous case. The main reason is that 
both nodes the authority and driver’s vehicle are moving (in this case the authority is 
represented by a vehicle). Consequently, it is more difficult to successfully finish the 
four messages exchanges used by the proposed On-SiteDriverID. 
 
Figure 9 Simulation results for V2V Communications 
However, the simulation results clearly show that about 60% of the processes started by 
the authorities are completed. Again, it is noticeable the role played by the 
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retransmissions that guarantee that more processes can be accomplished. Table 10 is 
included to provide more details about the simulation results. 
V2V Communications 
  Transmited  Received 
1 Authority Node 
 
Message Type 
 
Message Type 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Nº Messages Nº Messages 
0 Retransmission 14 11 11 3 11 8 
1 Retransmission 11 3 0 6 0 0 
2 Retransmissions 5 3 0 2 0 0 
4 Authority Nodes 
 
Message Type 
 
Message Type 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Nº Messages Nº Messages 
0 Retransmission 33 28 26 18 26 23 
1 Retransmission 15 5 0 9 0 0 
2 Retransmissions 7 5 0 1 0 0 
9 Authority Nodes 
 
Message Type  Message Type 
1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 
Nº Messages Nº Messages 
0 Retransmission 50 40 40 31 39 35 
1 Retransmission 19 5 0 8 1 0 
2 Retransmissions 12 5 0 2 0 0 
Table 10. Summary of simulation results for V2V communications 
6. Conclusions 
We propose in this paper On-SiteDriverID, a secure protocol and its application 
which allows road authorities to obtain drivers’ real identities on demand on VANET 
scenarios. This protocol and its application have been implemented using typical 
electronic devices used in a VANET integrated with the Spanish eID, which is the 
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device providing the secure identification of the driver against the road authorities. In 
order to get insights about the performance of the On-SiteDriverID application in a 
realistic VANET scenario, we have simulated the application running over a map of the 
city of Barcelona. The simulations have been developed on top of a set of software tools 
such as C4R (Citymob for Roadmaps) for the vehicles mobility generation and NS-2 for 
the network communications. We simulated two different VANET situations; the first 
one corresponds to 100 driver’s vehicles driving while the authority gets the driver’s 
identity remotely through the road infrastructure (RSUs), this represents a V2I 
communication in a VANET. In the second situation, the authority is represented by 
authority vehicles moving along roads, thus it corresponds to V2V communications. 
The obtained simulation results have shown that in the 60-70% of cases the proposed 
On-SiteDriverID successfully obtains the identity of the drivers. The remaining 40-30% 
of non-finished identification processes mainly correspond to vehicles that start the 
identification process but abandon the authority’s coverage area during the process. As 
the authorities are mainly interested in the identity of drivers that are close to them we 
envision that a future direction of this work would be to implement a location-based 
mechanism in which only the vehicles closer to the authorities are required to provide 
their identities. This could be implemented by including the location of the authority in 
the first message and forcing the identification of drivers which are within a perimeter 
centred in the authority. Another option to increase the percentage of finished 
identification processes would be to make use of faster cryptographic algorithms such 
us Elliptic Curve cryptography (ECC). This will allow finishing the identification 
processes in shorter time, thus having a bigger amount of processes finished. The DNIe 
smartcard does not implement yet ECC algorithms; however we expect that the Spanish 
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entity that issues the DNIe (Dirección General de la Policía, DGP) will include them in 
future versions. Thus, authorities would be able gather the real identity of a bigger 
amount of drivers and vehicles, allowing them to act in a safer and better manner in 
road traffic situations. 
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